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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. C. TEBBS, 
Plaintiff and App·elfant, 
vs. 
LYNN PETERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 7707 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from the judgment of dismissal 
entered upon the second trial. At the first trial a non-
suit was granted because it clearly appeared from the 
evidence that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
The collision occurred about four or five miles 
west of Duchesne, on the 5th of January, 1947, at 
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about 8:00 P.M., when the plaintiff drove his car 
into the rear end of the defendant's truck, which was 
proceeding towards Duchesne just ahead of the plai~ 
tiff. The question at the last trial in April, 19 51, was 
the same as at the first, which occurred in October, 
1948, to wit: Was plaintiff guilty of contributory 
negligence? which involves the further question as to 
whether plaintiff should have been permitted to go to 
the jury in vie·w of an about-face in his testimony, 
in an attempt to make a case, which on the first trial 
he did not have. 
POINT RELIED UPON 
That it appears from the record that appellant's 
evidence at the first trial clearly shows that he was 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. That his evi~ 
dence at the last trial, wherein he endeavors to excul~ 
pate himself, is so manifestly contrary to his former 
statements under oath as to justify the court in dis~ 
regarding it. 
ARGUMENT 
How far was the truck beyond the curve in the 
highway? At what distance did plaintiff see or should 
he have seen the truck after rounding the curve? What 
opportunity did he have to either pass to the left 
of the truck or to stop before colliding with it? What 
was the evidence at the first trial? What is the evidence 
at the second trial? Will the courts permit a plaintiff 
to trifle with the court by altering his testimony to 
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make a case, when on the first trial it affirmatively 
appeared that he had no case? 
EVIDENCE AT FIRST TRIAL 
At the first trial, plaintiff, then represented by 
attorneys Dillman and Shields, first fixed the point 
of impact of plaintiffs car with defendanf s truck at 
the east end of the curve referred to in the evidence 
(Tr. 34). The following day, after further consider-
ation, he changed his testimony and fixed the point of 
impact where the letters "HCT" appear in black on 
Exhibit 1, which point is approximately 275 feet 
east of the east end of the curve (Tr. 3 7). He further 
testified at the first trial that he was traveling about 
40 miles per hour (Tr. 4 3) and that with his lights 
at low beam, he could see about 200 feet (Tr. 32). 
Three times during the trial of the Hirose case (which 
arose out of the same collision) plaintiff stated that he 
was not over 12 feet away when he first saw the truck 
(Tr. 34 and 40) and later in the first trial of his own 
case he stated he could not have been over 20 feet away 
(Tr. 34), which statement he later amended to fix the 
distance at 50 feet (Tr. 34). 
With reference to cars approaching the truck from 
the opposite direction, he stated: 
"Q. No\.v, Mr. Tebbs, calling your at-
tention to your testimony at the last trial: 
'Q. Well didn't you tell us, Mr. 
Tebbs, that the truck that you saw on the 
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~ighway, or the object, was about 12 feet 
1n front of you when you first saw it? 
'A. That's right, when I saw it. 
'Q. Then you were watching ahead 
of you, weren't you? 
'A. Well, the only thing that has 
got me there, if I may answer, there could 
have been a car coming that might have 
blinded me somewhat. 
'Q. Well, was there a car coming? 
Did you see any car coming? 
'A. I don't know. 
'Q. Well, in other words, the fact 
there could have been a car coming is just 
a possibility, you don't remember any-
thing like that do you at this time? 
'A. I don't. 
''Q. Did you so testify? 
"A. I did, but may I state I was think-
ing of lights, not car; if you are blinded, you 
can't see a car. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, didn't you tell 
us before that vrhen you testified, the reason you 
didn't see the truck was as you came east around 
the curve your lights shot off the highway and 
when you suddenly straightened out to go east 
on the straight-of-way, the truck was right in 
front of you. Didn't you so testify? 
"A. I think so; yes sir, that's right. 
"Q. The last time we were over here on 
this case, we were here about three and a half 
days, were we not? 
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"A. I \Vas, yes sir. 
"Q. And other than vvhat you said, it 
vvas a possibility there \Vas a car could have 
blinded you there wasn't anything said about 
lights any time during the trial, \Vas there? 
"A. This was the only instance I remem-
ber of. 
"Q. And your testimony at that time 
that was a mere possibility; isn't that right? 
"A. That was right as to lights, but as 
to car, I don't contend I ever saw a car. I was 
blinded; that is the confusion of that testimony. 
"Q. And here we are now, April 30, 
19 51, and you say your memory is clearer now 
and you remember being blinded by lights? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And you put that in your complaint 
this time when you re-filed your suit, didn't 
you? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. After you talked to your lawyers, 
you decided those lights were there? 
"A. Well, I always had it in mind there 
was a light, whether it was a motorcycle or an 
automobile, I don't know, but I was blinded." 
(Tr. 40-41.) 
It will be noted that plaintiff endeavors to ex-
plain away his testimony that he did not kno\V 
whether he saw any car coming, by stating that he was 
thinking "of lights, not car." (Tr. 40.) If he was 
thinking of lights, then he evidently meant to say that 
he saw no lights approaching from the east when he 
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was asked if he saw a car. He also testified that the 
reason he did not see the truck was that as he rounded 
the curve, his lights shot off the highway and as he 
straightened out on the straight-of-way, the truck was 
right in front of him (Tr. 40-41). The one lane of 
travel was clear so that he might have passed to the 
left of the truck (Tr. 42). He testified that his lights 
on low beam revealed objects 200 feet away; that he 
did not see the truck until he was within 12 feet of it 
or 20 feet of it (Tr. 40, 32). He fixed the location of 
the point of impact at the first trial where the letters 
"HCT" in black appear on Exhibit 1, approximately 
2 7 5 feet east of the east end of the curve (Tr. 3 5). 
EVIDENCE AT THE SECOND TRIAL 
Plaintiff testified that he was blinded 'by the 
lights of an oncoming vehicle when he was "around 
the turn about 100 f2et"; that he was traveling ap-
proximately 40 miles per hour; that although he could 
have seen the truck 150 feet avvay, "coming that fast" 
he did not have time to turn left around it (Tr. 4 3); 
that the one lane of the high\vay was clear (Tr. 44); 
that there v1as a large rock protruding into the road 
as he werit around the curve, v1hich obstructed his 
vision and a mountain which goes back a long way 
"you can't see around," (Tr. 16); that the r-eE-k was 
located "300 feet or a little more"1~estfrom the truck 
(Tr. 16 Lthat-the--strortg -ltgpt blinded him when he 
was "probably 50 to 7D fee-t, I can't say," tram-the 
truck ( T r. 16: 1 7) ; that his brakes were in good con-
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\1>!<:1S asked if b.e savJ a £21:.• He also tcst-
i fied th<:1t the reason he did not see the 
trucl--. '.1-rns that as he rou.nd~-;d the curve, 
hls li.ghts shot off the 11ig_hv;ay r.·tnd as he 
straightened out on the straigh.t-of -way, 
the tr·uck ~Iss right in front of him ( Tr. 
h0-41). The one ··lane of travel \"las clear 
so t.hat he r~ivht have passed to the left 
of the truck (Tr. 42). He testified that 
his l·Ights on lo~r beam revealed objects 
;:oo feet a:t•lay; that hP, did not see the 
t~1ck until he was within 12 feet of it 
or 20 feet of it (Tr. 40, 32). He fixed 
the locat~ion of the point of impact at 
the first trial where the letters "HCT" 
in blnck appear on Exhibit 1, approximately 
275 feet east of the east end of the curve ( rrr. 3 5) • 
Plaintiff testified that he was 
blinded by the lifhts of an oncoming ve-
hicle wilen he was n a.rov.nd the tnrn about 
100 feet"; tha-t he ·w-as traveling approx-
il:l.ately 40 rniles per hour; that although 
be could have seen the t.ruck 150 feet av;ay, 
n coming that fast n he did not have time to 
turn left around it ('rr. 4.3); that the one 
lane of t~he high''i'..'UY was clear ( 'fr. 44) ; 
that there \'las n la.rge rock protruding into 
the ro.r"d as he went ttround the curve, tt.J"hich 
obstructed his vi::don and .;:;1 rnount.ain ~;'l]'hich 
goes back a lon.':_: way "you can't see around," 
(Tr. 16); "That the truck lttas located u300 
feet or a little rnoren southeast fro:;" the 
turn ('rr. 16); that he first observed the 
·truck 1-rhen he was rrprobably 50 to 70 feet, 
I can't say", {Tr. 16-17); that his braktl 
were in good con-
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clition; that the truck had no taillight (Tr. 18) and 
that the truck \Vas located at the point on Exhibit 1 
where he has marked a: red cross with the letters 
"HCT,. in black (Tr. 3 8), which is probably 125 
feet east of the east end of the curve. 
Hirose testified that ttvo cars came with bright 
lights which made him blind (Tr. 4), and that '\ve 
come to that rock and the turn, then at the same time 
big light come into us, make us blind,,. (Tr. 5); that 
there was no taillight on the truck and he first saw the 
truck ·when they were within 40 feet of it (Tr. 5), 
although at the first trial he stated that he first savv 
the truck w·hen he was within 200 feet of it (Tr. 11; 
however, ·when confronted with this later statement, 
he said, "I told you 200 feet but I don't know much 
at that time though" (Tr. II). Like Tebbs, who said 
that at the trial in October, 1948, he was very nerv-
ous and upset and "I di-dn't put the study and thought 
on it that I have now," (Tr. 39) Hirose seems also to 
have put some study on it and was therefore much 
better informed in 19 51 than he was in 1948. 
In addition to the testimony of plaintiff and 
Hirose, other evidence on plaintiff's behalf at the sec-
ond trial is to the effect that the front lights of Peter-
son's truck were on (Tr. 64); that Marchant and 
Wilkinson on their way west from Duchesne and at a 
point about a mile or a mile and a half east of the place 
of collision, were passed by a car going in the same di-
rection they were traveling (Tr. 71) -this to create 
the inference that it was the car with the blinding 
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lights, but there was no evidence that this car ever 
arrived at the place of the collision, or whether it turned 
out on some side road; however, it is a straw at which 
plaintiff grasps. Aside from the fact that it is alto-
gether improbable and unreasonable that Marchant 
and Wilkinson could in April, 19 51, recall that a car 
passed them at some particular point on a highway 
four years and three months prior to the date of their 
statement, their testimony does nothing more than to 
create an inference that this particular car proceeded 
to the place where the collision occurred, and based 
upon this inference is another inference that it had the 
bright lights which plaintiff claims blinded him. This 
is basing one inference upon another inference, which 
is not allowable. (Utah Foundry Co. v. Utah Gas 8 
Coke Co., 42 Utah 533, 131 P. 1173). 
It is remarkable that plaintiffs memory in April, 
19 5 1, two and one-half years after the first trial, is so 
much better than at the first trial in October, 1948, 
one year and a half after the event; however, he con-
firms his first statement that the truck was located 
approximately 275 feet east of the east end of the 
curve, by admitting at the seconq trial that in rounding 
the rock at the curve he was "300 feet or a little more" 
from the truck ( T r. 16) . However, the most serious 
departure from his testimony relates to the blinding 
lights of an oncoming car. From a statement at the 
first trial that there was just a possibility that he was 
blinded but that he remembered no car (Tr. 40-41), 
he stated at the second trial: 
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"Q. How do you account for that Mr. 
Tebbs, that when two years have gone by-
Let's say this trial was in O~tober 1948, and vve 
are now in 19 51, and you say your memory is 
clearer now that it was at that time? 
"A. I was very nervous and upset and I 
didn't put the study and thought on it that I 
have now. My best recollection now is that I 
was blinded." (Tr. 39.) 
and again he stated "my recollection today is positive 
I was blinded." (Tr. 40,) \Vhether he was blinded 
by the one light or two, he does not know (Tr. 41). 
The light could have been from a motorcycle (Tr. 42). 
In any event, he does not claim that there were lights 
from two cars, as did Hirose (Tr. 4). Plaintiff at-
tempts to escape the purport of his testimony at the 
first trial by the transparently ridiculous statement that 
at the first trial he was asked about seeing a ''car," not 
"lights" (Tr. 42); this to make it appear that his 
present statement that he was blinded by lights is con-
sistent with his former statement that he savv no car. 
Is it not passing strange that plaintiff, of course 
without the merest suggestion from anyone, worked 
out such a fine distinction? Is it not strange that, like-
wise, at the second trial, plaintiff came to realize how 
important it was for him to be blinded by lights in 
order to bring his case within technical rules of law 
announced in this court's decisions that blinding lights 
will, under some circumstances, relieve a plain tiff from 
the charge of contributory negligence? How strange 
that the plaintiff was able to educate himself and his 
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memory between the first trial and the second as to 
what evidence defeated him at the first trial and what 
changes were necessary to give him a chance to win at 
the second. How important it was to make it appear 
that it was not his fast driving or the fact that in 
rounding the curve ncoming that fast" (Tr. 43), his 
lights shot off the highway, w·hich prevented him from 
seeing the truck 300 feet or more away, but that he 
failed to see the truck because he was blinded by on-
coming lights. His becoming blinded just had to be 
in the case or he had no case and it would never do to 
have it appear from the record that when his lights 
would reveal objects 200 feet away, he did not see the 
truck until he was within 12 feet of it or within 20 
feet of it. That of itself would show gross careless-
ness, so he tries to make a somewhat better showing by 
now stating that although he could have seen the truck 
150 feet away (Tr. 4 3), the ct tha /he was blinded 
by the bright lights when was :g obably 50-70 feet 
away from the truck ( - . 16-1 caused him to col-
lide with it. This e ·aence s ws that he traveled at 
least 80 feet whi the true could have been seen by 
him before the tghts bli ed him, so he had plenty of 
opportunit to stop nd a J.j.djng ,Fitb_i!; 
(Hanson v. Clyde, 89 Ut. 31; 56 P. (2nd) 1366). 
The facts in this case as developed at the first trial 
are practically- the same as in the case ofDalley v. Mid-
western Dairy Products Company, 80 Ut. 331; 15 P. 
(2nd) 309, the only exception being that the straight-
of-way approching the truck in the Dalley case was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
memory between the first trial and the 
second ae to what evidence defeated him 
at the first trial s.nd what changes were 
necessary to give him a chance to win at 
the second. How important it was to make 
it anr.ear that it \faa not his fast driv-
ing or the ract that in rounding the curve 
"eoming that fast" (Tr. 43), his lights 
shot oft the highway, which prevented him 
from seeing the truck 300 feet or n~r• ~ 
away, but that he failed to see the truck 
because he was blinded by the oncoming 
lights. His becoming blinded just had 
to be in the case or he had no case and 
it would never do to have it appear from 
the record that when his lights would re-
veal objects 200 teet away, he did not 
see the truck until he was within 12 teet 
of it or within 20 feet of it. That ot 
itself would show gross carelessness, so 
he tries to make a somewhat better show• 
ing by now stating that although he could 
have seen the truek 150 feet away (Tr. 43), 
the £act that he was blinded by the bright 
lights when he was probably 50-70 teet 
awa.y from the truck (Tr. 16-17) caused him 
to collide with it. {Hanson v. Clyde, g9 
Ut. 31; ;6 P (2nd} 1366). 
The facts in this ease as de-
veloped at the first trial are practically 
the same as in the ease or Dalley v. 
Midwestern Dairy Products Company, 80 
Ut. 331; 15 P (2nd) 309, the only ex-
ception being that the straight of l'Jay ap-
proaching the truek in ·che Dalley case was 
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longer than the 300-foot straight-of-way bet\veen the 
east end of the curve and the defendant's truck in this 
case. It appeared in the Dalley case that Dalley' 8 car 
was equipped with good lights and good brakes; that 
the lights on his car \vould disclose ordinary objects 
about 200 feet ahead; that Dalley did not see the truck 
until he was within 15 or 20 feet of it; that there \Vere 
no lights on the rear end of the truck; that he \vas keep-
ing a constant lookout ahead; that just before he 
struck the truck, he was traveling on the right side of 
the road and the truck \vas on the right side of the road 
but the lights of his car did not reveal a car until he 
\vas \Vithin 15 or 20 feet from \Vhere it was standing 
and that if the truck had been equipped with a tail 
light he ·would have been able to see the truck in tin1e 
to stop or turn out; that he \Vas unable to stop or turn 
his car so as to avoid collision after he discovered the 
truck. Counsel's remark that the Dalley case ~Nas de-
cided by a 3-2 decision and that it has been subject to 
some adverse criticism, should not lessen his good opin-
ion of it. Rather, as the author of it, he can l-:'2ve a 
sense of pride in the fact that no criticism which has 
been offered against the decision has been sufficient to 
overcome it. 
In Gohlinghorst vs. Ruess, 146 Neb. 475, 20 
N. W. (2nd) 381, plaintiff's testimony as to facts 
concerning the collision, was contrary to her deposition 
in another case in vrhich she was not a party. The court 
for that reason affirmed a dismissal of her case. To 
quote: 
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"It is the contention of the defendants that 
where a plaintiff materially changes her sworn 
testimony in this manner to meet the exigencies 
arising in the trial of the case that it is discredit-
ed as a matter of lavv and should be disregarded. 
"We think the testimony of plaintiff was 
such that it cannot sustain a judgment in her 
favor. A plaintiff may not recite upon oath one 
statement of facts in one judicial proceeding and 
then, to meet the exigencies of the occasion in 
the trial of a different suit, recite under oath an 
entirely different story. As was said in Gorm-
ley v. Peoples Cab, Inc., 142 Neb. 346, 12 SCJ 
31, 6 N. W. (2d) 78: 
lSuch conduct cannot be tolerated to 
the extent, when it is clearly apparent, of 
requiring a trial judge to submit the credi-
bility of such testimony to a jury, and of 
permitting a party to mock law and jus-
tice.' 
* * * * 
"The convenient loss of memory to escape 
the fatal effect of positive sworn testimony on 
the one hand, and in amazing resurrection of 
memory more than two years later as to facts 
and incidents tending to make a case, make the 
evidence incredible as a matter of law in the ab-
scence of any reasonable expanation of the con-
flict. 
* * * * 
"It is the general rule in this jurisdiction 
that in a jury trial when the defendant moves 
for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs 
evidence, such motion must be treated as an ad-
mission of the truth of all rna terial and relevant 
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evidence and all proper inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, and if the evidence so considered 
tends to sustain the allegations of the petition, 
and the petition states a cause of action, the case 
should be submitted to the jury. But this rule 
does not control where it appears that other evi-
dence of the plaintif demonstrates conclusively, 
or to a degree that the minds of reasonable men 
cannot differ thereon, that such evidence fav-
orable to plaintiff is incapable of belief." 
See also Peterson vs. R.R. Co. (Neb.) 2 78 
N. W. 561; Ellis vs. Omaha Cold 
Storage Co. (Neb.) 250 N. W. 760. 
In Smith v. R. R. Co., 184 Fed. 387, the court 
uses this language: 
''As the inconsistency is in the testimony 
of a party, a stricter rule is applicable than where 
the inconsistency is in the testimony of an ordi-
nary witness. * * * While it is true that upon 
a second trial the plaintiffs case may be changed 
or strengthened by new testimony, yet the right 
of a plaintiff at a second trial to make by his 
own testimony a complete departure from the 
case presented at the first trial is not unlimited. 
A plaintiff, we think, having sworn to facts 
resting in his own observation and kno·wledge 
before one jury, should not be permitted to 
swear to facts directly inconsistent and to obtain 
from a second jury a verdict in his favor ·which 
will involve the conclusion that his· testimony 
at the first trial was knowingly false. A party 
testifying under oath is more than mere witness. 
He is an actor seeking the intervention of the 
judicial power in his behalf, and thus subject 
to the rule ~allegans contraria non est audiendus,' 
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which, as stated in Broom's Legal Maxims, page 
130, 'expresses in technical language the trite 
saying of Lord Kenyon that a man should not 
be permitted to "blow hot and cold" v1ith refer-
ence to the same transaction, or insist at differ-
ent times, on the truth of each of two conflicting 
allegations according to the promptings of his 
private interest.' " 
See also Hamilton vs. Frothingham, 
(Mich.) 40 N. VI. 15. 
In Steele v. R. R. Co., (1\tlo.) 175 S. W. 177, 
the court remarks: 
"\Ve are not bound, even as appellate 
court, to believe a mere witness in a case where 
it appears from conclusive physical facts or 
otherwise patently that such evidence is either 
perjured or clearly mistaken. Why then are we 
compelled to beleive a litigant swearing for him-
self under the same circumstances." 
In Insurance Co. v. Bonacci, Ill Fed. (2) 412, 
the court declares that a party cannot in his own case 
be heard by a court to deny what he solemnly sv1ore 
was true yesterday. 
This case is not only important from the stand-
point of the interest of the parties involved; it is also 
important because it will give the courts and the legal 
profession an opportunity to ascertain whether this 
court will tolerate trifling in judicial proceedings. This 
is no case where a witness made an honest mistake in 
his testimony, which, of course, he should always be 
permitted to correct on timely application, but after 
revealing the facts to the counsel he first employed, 
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and deliberately testifying in support of his complaint 
as to all the facts and circumstances surrounding tbe 
coilision, plaintiff employs other counsel to whom, 
two years and a half follovring the first trial, and after 
he had put more study and thought on it, (Tr. 39) 
he revealed other facts, to wit: That the truck was 
located near the east end of the curve, and that posi-
tively, and without any question, he \Vas blinded with 
lights, which fact his former employed, Hirose, con-
firms. To prove that the impact occurred nearer the 
end of the curve, plaintiff states that he found certain 
bits of chrome which he identified as a part of his car 
and ·which he picked up when, in company with bis 
son, he went back to the highway two months after 
he got out of the hospital (Tr. 50). He had been con-
fined to the hospital for nearly six weeks (Tr. 21), 
so he picked up the chrome more than one hundred 
days after the collision and after the highway had been 
covered with snow and sleet and in all likelihood, 
scraped by highway machinery (Tr. 56-57), all of 
which conditions rendered the evidence of \Vhere the 
chrome was found absolutely worthless as tending to 
prove where the collision occurred. 
As much as we regret the necessity of such a state-
ment, we say that there could not be a more obvious 
"doctoring" of testimony in order to avoid the conse-
quences of prior statements under oath, and in order to 
avoid the rule in the Dalley case and to make applicable 
the doctrine of the Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 U t. 40 1; 
62 P. (2nd) 117, case with respect to blit?-ding lights. 
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We respectfully submit that the trial court was 
clearly justified in holding that "the plaintiff is bound 
by the testimony given in the former hearingu and that 
even if plaintiff was blinded by lights he should have 
slowed down. 
STEWART, CANNON ~ HANSON 
AND E. F. BALDWIN, JR., 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
I 
( 
I 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
